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Abstract
Globalization is defined for individuals as their connectivity in global networks. Social identity
is conceptualized as attachment and identification with a group. We measure individual
involvement with global networks and local, national, and global social identity through a
questionnaire. Propensity to cooperate is measured in experiments involving local and global
others. Firstly, we analyze possible determinants of global social identity. Overall, attachment
to global identity is significantly lower than national and local identity, but there is a significant
positive correlation between global social identity and an index of individual global connectiv-
ity. Secondly, we find a significant mediating effect of global social identity between individual
global connectivity and propensity to cooperate at the global level. This is consistent with a
cosmopolitan hypothesis of how participation in global networks reshapes social identity:
Increased participation in global networks increases global social identity and this in turn
increases propensity to cooperate with others. We also show that this model receives more
support than alternative models substituting either propensity to associate with others or gen-
eral generosity for individual global connectivity. We further demonstrate that more globalized
individuals do not reduce contributions to local accounts while increasing contributions to
global accounts, but rather are overall more generous. Finally, we find that the effect of global
social identity on cooperation is significantly stronger in countries at a relatively low stage of
globalization, compared to more globalized countries.
Introduction
Globalization has been defined as the increased diffusion of worldwide connections between
people [1,2]. Technological progress in various domains, from information technologies to
shipping, makes it possible for people to engage with each other at unprecedented speed
regardless of the distance separating them [2]. In the words of Harvey [3], globalization entails
compression of time and space. This process encompasses several domains. In the economic
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domain, international trade and capital movements are at historically unprecedented levels. In
the social domain, the internet has made possible instantaneous connections irrespective of
distances. In the cultural domain, more and more people access the same sources of informa-
tion or forms of entertainment worldwide. A growing awareness of the “world as a whole” [1]
informs the action of many people. Indexes of globalization testify that globalization has been
rising steadily over the last four decades [4,5].
The pervasiveness and comprehensiveness of globalization is likely to radically restructure
individuals’ sense of the self, their social identity, their attachment to local vis-à-vis global com-
munities, as well as their values. In spite of the relevance of this phenomenon, the empirical
evidence on the issue is scant and limited to cross-country survey-based analyses. In this paper
we draw on experimental evidence coming from a study that was explicitly designed to mea-
sure large-scale interconnectedness at the individual-level, and to examine its correlation with
the propensity to engage in cooperative activities with global others.
It has been demonstrated that participation in global networks is significantly correlated with
propensity to cooperate with global others [6–8]. More “globalized” individuals are significantly
more inclined to cooperate with global others in comparison with less globalized individuals.
Furthermore, the same correlation holds at the country level. The higher the aggregate level of
globalization of a country, the higher the average levels of cooperation by their citizens [6].
Buchan et al. [7] show that the development of a global social identity is also positively
associated with cooperation at the global level. The higher the identification with the
global community, the higher one’s level of cooperation with global others. In the present
paper we further expand the analysis of the linkages between globalization, social identity,
and propensity to cooperate, addressing the following two questions: (1) What are the
possible factors affecting global social identity? (2) Does global social identity exert a
mediating effect in the relationship between participation in globalization and propensity
to cooperate?
Our hypothesis is that participation in global networks reshapes individuals’ social
identity by expanding the number and inclusiveness of groups to which individuals expe-
rience a sense of belonging and identification. In other words, we conjecture that the pro-
cess of globalization expands the boundaries of the groups to which an individual
attributes emotional and psychological attachment—the “ingroup”- relative to the group
of people perceived as lying outside such groups–the “outgroup”. At the limit, the process
of globalization may mold a cosmopolitan individual, for whom, as Giddens [9] suggests,
“humankind becomes a ‘we’ where there are no ‘others’”.
In this paper we provide comprehensive evidence supporting what we call the cosmopol-
itan hypothesis [7,10,11]. We show that: (a) higher participation in global networks is asso-
ciated with higher identification with the global community; (b) social identity has a
mediating effect in the relationship between participation in globalization and propensity to
cooperate. That is, more globalized individuals cooperate more with global others than do
less globalized individuals in as much as their level of global social identity is higher. Both
the global social identity and the individual connectivity indexes have been newly developed
for our research, thus offering fresh insights into the psychological and attitudinal factors
that are associated with individual propensity to cooperate. Our research was conducted in
the US, Italy, Russia, Argentina, South Africa and Iran, thus spanning a broad range of the
globalization spectrum and enabling us to test the generalizability of our results for coun-
tries at different levels of globalization and modernization. We conclude that the develop-
ment of a “global we” identity may be one of the key elements to address problems
requiring global cooperation.
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Materials and methods
Conceptualizing globalization
Theories of globalization hint at the transcendence–or compression—of space and time in
human relations as the distinctive feature of globalization. The crux of globalization is seen in
the progressive elimination of physical boundaries to interpersonal relations, as a result of
widespread technological progress. The range of activities that is affected by these changes is
so broad that several spheres of human relations are likely to be influenced at the same time.
Even if the issue of geographical distance is certainly central to globalization, various theo-
ries differ on the emphasis they put upon it. Early definitions referred generically to “the inten-
sification of worldwide social relations linking distant localities in such a way that local
happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa” [9]. Other con-
ceptualizations in turn emphasized the necessity of these links to be transnational [12], or
transcontinental [13]. Other theorists [2,3] go a step further in arguing that the nature of glob-
alization is best captured by the idea of “deterritorialization”–or “supra-territorialization”—of
human relations. Scholte [14] thus discusses globalization as “the spread of transplanetary and
[. . .] supra-territorial connections between people. From this perspective, globalization
involves reduction in barriers to transworld contacts. People become more able–physically,
legally, culturally, and psychologically–to engage with each other in ‘one world’.”. Supra-terri-
torialization is the characteristic that causes the spatial location of the people being connected
to become irrelevant. For instance, with the internet–the supra-territorial space par excellence–
two individuals may connect with each other regardless of their physical location, provided
they have access to the network. With global trade, goods produced in any country in the
world–including cultural products such as Hollywood blockbusters—can be supplied to an
individual living in another country, provided that the countries are part of the international
trade network. To be sure, globalization has to be understood as a process leading to the ideal
condition of supra-territorialization, rather than as a state where this condition is realized
under all relevant domains.
Conceptualizing social identity
Our main conjecture is that the social, cultural, economic and psychological engagement
inherent in globalization has the effect of reshaping an individual’s social identity. By social
identity we mean “that part of the individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of
his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance
attached to that membership” [15]. Social identity relies on categorization–namely, the psycho-
logical process of assigning people to categories, identification–namely, the process whereby
an individual associates him/herself with certain groups, and comparison–i.e. the process
whereby one’s own group is compared with other groups [16]. A key distinction is put forward
between the “ingroup” and the residual category of the “outgroup”. An ingroup can be defined
as a group to which an individual (a) categorizes herself as being part of, (b) identifies with,
and (c) triggers comparisons with other groups.
Turner et al. [17] proposed three possible levels of self-categorization, categorization at the
level of humankind being the highest. At the intermediate level differences between one’s
ingroup and outgroup and similarities within one’s ingroup help define the self, while at the
lowest level it is the differentiation from other ingroup members that shapes an individual’s
identity. Most of the research effort related to social identity has thus far focused on the inter-
mediate level of ingroup-outgroup categorization, investigating the conditions under which
‘ingroup favouritism’, i.e. a tendency to treat more favorably ingroup members than outgroup
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members in situations of strategic interaction, is generated [18–26]. Little attention has been
devoted to the exploration of the highest level of self-categorization [10,11,27]. This paper
aims to contribute to fill this gap.
The link between globalization and social identity
Theories of globalization suggest opposite ‘ideal types” that result from the process of globali-
zation, namely, the “cosmopolitan” individual and the “reactant” individual [6,28]. The former
suggests that individuals involved in global networks experience heightened global social iden-
tity. The ingroup boundary is shifted outward to include groups of people formerly conceived
as part of the ‘outgroup’. At the limit, this process may involve the whole of humanity
[9,13,17,29]. The flourishing of several ‘global’ social movements around a variety of causes
such as human rights or the environment, and the growing importance of global humanitarian
relief operations are all instances of the diffusion of a ‘cosmopolitan’ individual [30,31].
In contrast, the “reactant” individual hypothesis predicts increased attachment to tradi-
tional loyalties, such as local and national communities, as an effect of globalization. According
to this model, globalization enhances even further the cleavage between ingroup and outgroup
[28,32,33], as it triggers a negative reaction by the individual against the global flows of objects,
commodities, people, ideas. This may lead to an entrenchment in the state-nation community
or even to adhesion to fundamentalist movements [28,34]. In terms of the ingroup-outgroup
model, the presence of an “other” is made more vivid to members of an ingroup, thus strength-
ening even further the constricted parochial boundary between the “us” and “them”.
Buchan et al. [6,7] found evidence consistent with the “cosmopolitan” ideal-type. Individu-
als who were more involved in global networks were significantly more inclined to cooperate
with global others than individuals who were less globalized [6]. Identification with the “world
as a whole”, that is, the distinct notion of the common fate shared by many individuals around
the globe as a result of their increased inter-connectedness [1] is also an important aspect of
globalization. Individuals who identify most with the “world as a whole” relative to national
and local communities are more inclined to cooperate with global others [7].
Importantly, these results suggested a transformation of motives and values from self-inter-
est to group interest and concern for the welfare of the group such that increases in global
social identity are associated with increased cooperation with the global collective. Signifi-
cantly, this positive effect of global social identity on cooperation was above and beyond expec-
tations about how others in the group would behave.
Direct and indirect effects of involvement with globalization and
propensity to cooperate: The cosmopolitan hypothesis
Building on our understanding of the linkages between globalization, social identity and coop-
eration just presented we argue that participation in global networks may both have a direct
and an indirect effect on cooperation. We classify as direct effects of individual involvement
with global networks all those effects that take place independently from the restructuring of
global social identity. Such direct effects may occur for a variety of reasons. Increased involve-
ment in global networks may increase the amount of information and knowledge that an indi-
vidual has about people living outside local and national communities. Global networks
provide individuals with information about events taking place in far-away places, report on
global-others’ life-style and cultural traits and distribute products and objects from foreign
countries. The idea of a “global other” may thus turn from being a remote and indefinite
notion to a more concrete and well-defined image of geographically distant people living in a
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globalized world. Such increased familiarity with groups of people previously held as remote–
both in geographical and social terms–may trigger increased propensity to cooperate.
Increased involvement in global networks may also make an individual more aware of the
opportunities arising from cooperating worldwide. Deeper awareness of the global nature of the
problems facing people from all around the world may instill a greater consciousness of the
importance of global cooperation and may increase the symmetrical expectation that global oth-
ers also become more conscious about the necessity of global action. This increased awareness
in itself may strengthen the propensity to cooperate at the global level. Moreover, the observa-
tion of cases in which global others have successfully achieved and maintained cooperation may
increase an individual’s trust in them, thus strengthening a positive disposition to cooperate.
In addition to these mechanisms, we also put forward what we refer to as the “cosmopolitan
hypothesis”. We posit that participation in global networks may have an indirect effect on
cooperation with global others, inasmuch as it increases one’s identification with the global
community. Such a mechanism can be broken down into two constitutive parts. Firstly,
increased participation and involvement in global networks bring about heightened identifica-
tion and attachment to the global community. More individuals will find the global commu-
nity as being a relevant part for the construal of the self, and they will do so with higher
intensity. As a result, global social identity increases. Secondly, social identity theory argues
that increased identification with a group goes hand-in-hand with increased propensity to
cooperate with that group [16,17,35–40]. When individuals attach their sense of self to their
group membership, they see themselves as interchangeable components of a larger social unit
[17]. This engenders a shift of motives and values from self-interest to group interest and con-
cern for the welfare of fellow group members. Pursuing the group’s interest thus becomes a
direct and natural expression of self-interest. When these two constitutive elements operate
together, increased involvement with the global networks will increase identification with the
global community, and this in turn will be accompanied by increased propensity to cooperate
with global others. This mechanism is visually illustrated in Fig 1B.
The experimental measure of cooperation
Our project involved adult populations from specific locations in six different countries (Iran,
South Africa, Argentina, Russian Federations, Italy, and the US). Participants in our research
took part in three experimental decisions that assessed their propensity to cooperate in Public
Goods Games (PGG). No feedback was given at the end of each decision, thus successive
choices could not be influenced by the outcomes of prior decisions. Here we discuss the last of
the three decisions, which entailed cooperation at the global level. Cooperation was measured
through a Multi-level Sequential Contribution (MSC) game. The setting is similar to standard
PGGs except that participants’ decisions were made sequentially rather than simultaneously.
Participants’ decisions affected the payoffs of other participants taking part in future sessions.
In turn, participants’ payoffs were determined by their own decisions, as well as by decisions
made by participants in previous sessions. Details of the experimental procedures can be
found in the S4 Appendix.
Each participant was endowed with 10 tokens, each worth the purchasing power equivalent
of US $0.50 in each country. In the third experimental decision, participants made their deci-
sions by allocating the 10 tokens across three different envelopes, named “Personal”, “Local”,
and “World”. Each token allocated to the Personal account was simply transferred to the par-
ticipant’s final earnings account and yielded no benefits to others. That is, its Marginal Per
Capita Return (MPCR) was one. Conversely, each token allocated into the Local envelope was
added to the Local contributions by three other participants from the same locality. This total
Globalization, social identity and individual cooperation
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was doubled by the experimenter and the participant received one-quarter of the total. Thus,
each token allocated to the Local account entailed a half token loss for the participant and
yielded a half token gain to three other participants from the same local area. The MPCR for
the local account was 0.5 (less than the MPCR of the Personal account), but the Marginal
Social Return (MSR), measuring the returns for the group, was 2.
The World account comprised the participant, the same three local people who were part of
the Local account, and two four-person groups from two different countries. The specific
countries were not named. Rather, participants were informed that these countries might have
been from any of the four continents where the research was conducted. Not naming countries
made choices unaffected by biases or stereotypes about particular nationalities. This is impor-
tant because stereotypes can be deeply enrooted and widespread worldwide, while being at the
same time fundamentally wrong [41]. This approach is also consistent with our definition of
globality as a notion that transcends mere internationalization. Tokens allocated to the World
account were summed, tripled by the researcher and the participant received a one-twelfth
Fig 1. Mediating effect of global social identity between individual involvement with globalization, as measured by the IGI, and
propensity to cooperate at global level. The values in the dashed-contour boxes are the coefficients, expressed in units of standard
deviation, estimated in an OLS econometric analysis using the same models as in Table 2. The number in parenthesis is the p-value of the
test that the coefficient is equal to zero. The stars denote the level of significance of the rejection of the null hypothesis (� = p<0.1; �� =
p<0.05; ��� = p<0.01). Panel (a) reports coefficients for the model that does not include GSI as covariate (corresponding to Table 2:
column 1); Panel (b) reports coefficients for the models including GSI as covariate (corresponding to Table 2: column 2 and 3). Fig 1
reports coefficients based on the OLS estimation that has been used for the Sobel-Goodman mediation test reported in Table 3, column 1.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0206819.g001
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share from the total. Each token allocated to the World account thus yielded a token loss for
the subject and yielded a ¼ token gain to each of the 11 others matched with that subject. The
MPCR is 0.25 and the MSR is 3 for the World account. Thus, contributing to either the Local
or World account can be classified as a cooperative act in that the individual sacrifices immedi-
ate personal gain for greater gain at the collective level. Participants’ identity was not revealed
either to other participants or to the experimenter, as the game was played in conditions of
anonymity. Participants were told that they were involved in a series of decisions involving
people from their own local area, some of whom may or may not be in the same room, and
from other countries around the world.
The structure of incentives resembled a nested PGG similar to that employed by Black-
well and McKee [42] and Wit and Kerr [43]. The design is seen schematically in Fig 2. In
the MSC, an individual willing to maximize her final payoffs should allocate all tokens to
the Personal account, because both the Local and World accounts bear a smaller MPCR. If
no one contributed, each participant would take home their initial 10 tokens. Prior research
shows that many individuals choose to act in the interests of the group [44]. In our MSC
there is a tension between individual returns, social returns, and the locality of the people
benefitting from one’s contribution. Individuals allotting their tokens to their Local account
can so ensure the maximization of the interests of the Local constituency. But if everyone
contributed their endowment to their Local account, the final individual payoffs would be
20 tokens, which is less than if everyone allotted their tokens to the World account, that is,
30 tokens. We regard contributions to the Local account as being driven by parochial inter-
ests, whilst contributions to the World account reflect cosmopolitan interests. In the
remainder of the paper we will refer to them as Local-level and World-level cooperation,
respectively.
The second experimental decision, which we do not analyze in this paper, was another
MSC where a National account replaced the World account, as people interacted with other
groups from their country but not from their locality. The first experimental decision was a
standard linear PGG involving only people from the same locality as the group. We use
Fig 2. Representation of the nested social dilemma. I stands for “Individual”. ‘Local 1’, ‘Local 2’, ‘Local 3’ represent
groups of people residents in the same locality in three different countries. Individuals have three options on how to
allocate their endowments of 10 tokens: allocating to a personal account, to their local account, and to the global
account, which comprises the three lower-level local accounts. Contributions to the personal account are transferred
one-to-one onto an individual’s payoff. Contributions to one’s local account are multiplied by a factor of two and
divided among four local residents. Contributions to the global accounts are multiplied by a factor of three and divided
evenly among the 12 participants.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0206819.g002
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cooperation in the first decision as a control for the baseline propensity to cooperate at the
local level in the foregoing analysis.
Participants’ decisions were collected by the researchers and randomly matched with previous
participants’ decisions through an electronic algorithm. Payments were calculated while subjects
completed a questionnaire and were handed out at the end of the session. Average take-home
earnings from the experiment were the purchasing power equivalent of US$34, including the pur-
chasing power equivalent of a US$8 show-up fee. Sessions lasted around 90 minutes. Our MSC
design yielded three important features. First, this design realistically mapped onto the nature of
local-global relations. In the global economy, globalization does not exclude the local constituency
but potentially expands the level of inclusion to both local and non-local participants. Second, our
design also captured the tension between the different incentives from giving to the local vis-à-vis
the global good. In our design, the MPCR from giving to the local public account is greater than
that of the global account; but on the other hand, the social return is higher in the latter. In this
fashion, we are able to examine under which conditions individuals put global interests ahead of
local ones when everyone might be able to benefit in the long run. Third, our design was as parsi-
monious and easily-understood by participants as possible. Preliminary tests of different versions
of the games on college students in the US, Canada, and Spain, demonstrated that the return
ratios we adopted was the most easily understood by participants.
Questionnaire-based variables
The main dependent variable of our analysis -namely, the individual’s allocation to a global
public good in a nested PGG—was obtained from the MSC just described. The independent
variables for our analysis come from an individual level questionnaire that participants com-
pleted at the end of the experiment.
The first and most important aspect that the questionnaire was designed to measure was
individual exposure and participation in global relations. This measure, originally devel-
oped for our research, is–to the best of our knowledge—the first example of an individual
level index of globalization. Analogous to the country-level globalization index (CGI) devel-
oped by the Center for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation [4] (see Tables A and
B in S1 Appendix), the questionnaire was designed to capture individual access to globaliza-
tion within the social, cultural, political, and economic spheres. The resulting Individual
Globalization Index (IGI) is a summative scale of 30 questionnaire items listed in Table C in
the S1 Appendix. The text of the questions is reported in the S3 Appendix. Further method-
ological details on the construction of both the CGI and the IGI are illustrated in the S2
Appendix. The IGI measures an individual’s usage of various global networks in terms of
two dimensions: the frequency with which an individual accesses the networks, and the ter-
ritorial scope. The index identifies several media of global connection and measures the
temporal frequency with which the medium of connection is used by the individual and
whether such a medium is used to contact people at the local, national, or global level.
Although a given medium of connection, such as the email, has a potentially global reach,
an individual can also decide to use it for contacts at the local or national levels. The IGI,
therefore, assigns higher scores to individuals who participate in the global network more
frequently and on a larger scope than others.
In addition to the IGI items, a set of three social identity measures was included in the ques-
tionnaire. The items were taken from the measure of social identity constructed by Yuki et al.
[45] and adapted to assess social identification at the levels of the local community, the nation,
and the world. For example, in Kazan, Russia, the items measuring social identity at the level
of the local community read:
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1) How strongly do you feel attachment to your community in Kazan?
2) How strongly do you define yourself as a member of your community in Kazan?
3) How close do you feel to other members of your community in Kazan?
Social identities at the national and global level are measured substituting the following
expressions, respectively, for “your community in Kazan”: “your community in Russia”, and
“the world as a whole”. Responses to each item are made on a rating scale from 1 (not at all) to
4 (very much).
The questionnaire also included some questions to assess awareness of, and attitudes
toward global processes. Robertson [1] suggests that a key aspect of globalization is, in addition
to participation into global networks, the “consciousness of the world as a whole”. It is there-
fore important to assess how the key constructs in our analysis relate to one’s global awareness.
We constructed a ‘Global Awareness Index’, based on the answers to four questionnaire items
inquiring about a participant’s awareness of the following global issues: global warming, the
spread across the planet of potentially dangerous diseases, the action of the International
Criminal Courts of justice, and the persistent gap between rich and poor people around the
world. Other questions measured an individual’s attitudes towards global processes. Some,
taken from the World Value Survey [46], were included to measure the presence of ethnocen-
tric attitudes, specifically, the participant’s willingness to restrict migrants’ access, and the
necessity to protect national culture from foreign influence. Other questions from the PEW
[47] Global Attitudes Survey inquired about a participant’s opinions on international trade
and migration. Finally, standard demographic measures were included to control for factors
such as age, gender, level of income, ethnicity, education, and employment. Descriptive statis-
tics for the main variables of interest, for the demographics of the sample are reported in
Tables D and E in S1 Appendix.
Selection of research environments, sampling techniques, and
implementation
Research sites were selected for this research with the goal of representing a sufficient degree
of variability on the globalization spectrum as ranked by the CGI [4]. Six countries were cho-
sen, with the aim of both maximizing the dispersion of each sphere of the CGI–namely, the
economic, social, and political sphere–and of ensuring a sufficient geographic dispersion, so
that each continent–apart from Oceania–was represented. The choice fell on Italy and Argen-
tina (respectively, at the highest and lowest positions in the economic globalization sub-
index); US and South Africa (at the extremes of the social globalization index); Russia and Iran
(at the extremes of the political globalization index).
We selected several locations in each country which, on the basis of available information
prior to conducting research, represented differing levels of exposure to globalization as per,
for instance, the relative presence of multi-national corporations or the presence of immigrant
populations. In general, in each country a large urban center was designated as the ‘hub’ of the
fieldwork, and less globalized towns or villages were selected within a radius of around 100
miles. Hub localities in the US, Italy, Russian Federation and Argentina were Columbus
(Ohio), Milan, Kazan (Tatarastan), and Buenos Aires, respectively. For logistical constraints,
the same strategy was not feasible neither in Iran nor South Africa. In Iran the two research
sites were Tehran–Iran’s capital and largest city–and Shiraz–the fifth largest city [48]. In South
Africa research sites were three districts of Northern Johannesburg and the district of Soweto,
residents of the latter district being almost exclusively of Black ethnic background. Research
sites within Iran and South Africa are nonetheless characterized by appreciably different
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degrees of exposure to globalization within each country, thus ensuring the comparability of
our samples across countries. Our econometric analysis includes country fixed effect, thus
ensuring that any difference in the sampling strategy across countries is controlled for.
Approximately 200 participants were recruited in each country according to a quota sam-
pling method. The quota sampling method aims to target a uniform distribution of observa-
tions across relevant demographic dimensions. This method is suitable for cross-country
comparative research because it achieves comparability. In our study, the criteria determining
the quotas were age (three categories: 19–30, 31–50, 51–70), gender (two categories: male,
female), and social economic status (three categories: high, intermediate, and low).
The Institutional Review Board (IRB) of the University of Wisconsin-Madison and the Eth-
ics Committee of Warwick University provided ethical approval to the project. Oral informed
consent was obtained from every participant. The opportunity of obtaining written consent
from participants was discussed with the University of Wisconsin-Madison IRB. The IRB
finally requested oral consent rather than written consent. The IRB feared that keeping a writ-
ten record of participants’ names may have possibly compromised their safety in countries
such as Iran and Russia, because of the risk that participants would be associated with pro-US
activities, given the nationality of the project’s main funding body–the US National Science
Foundation. A template of the information and informed consent form and of instructions are
reported in the S4 Appendix.
Results
Descriptive statistics
The social identification scores at each level (local social identity—LSI; national social identity
—NSI; and global social identity—GSI) were calculated by summing up responses to the three
items. The scores, given originally in a 1–4 scale, have been normalized to the 0–1 interval. So,
individuals scoring one (zero) in, say, the LSI answered that they feel very strong attachment
(no attachment) to their local community, define themselves very strongly (not at all) as a
member of their local community, and feel very close (not close at all) to other members of
their local community. The Cronbach’s alphas of the three social identity items are 0.78 for
LSI, 0.72 for NSI, and 0.75 for GSI.
Fig 3 reports the average values of the three social identity measures in each country. For all
countries, except the Russian Federation, the strongest identification occurs on average at the
national level, followed by the local and then the global level. In the Russian Federation, identi-
fication is strongest at the local level, followed by the national and the global level. According
to non-parametric Wilcoxon sign-rank tests, the difference between LSI and NSI is not signifi-
cant in any country except for the Russian Federation (p<0.001; see Table F, panel d in the S1
Appendix) – where participants tend to report higher LSI than NSI–and Italy (p<0.001; see
Table F, panel e in the S1 Appendix) – where on the contrary participants report higher NSI
than LSI. The result in Russia may be driven by the ethnic diversity of the sample, as people
with ethnicity different from Russian identify more with local than national identity. Merging
all observations together, there is no statistically significant difference between LSI and NSI
(p = 0.20; Table F, panel g in the S1 Appendix). On the contrary, the difference between GSI
and the other two social identity measures is always statistically significant (see Table F, panel
g in the S1 Appendix). The country where such differences are relatively contained and do not
always reach strongly significant differences is the US (p = 0.070 for the difference between LSI
and GSI; p = 0.0026 for the difference between NSI and GSI; see Table F, panel f in the S1
Appendix).
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McFarland et al. [10] developed a measure of “Identification with all humanity” (IWAH)
that evaluates the extent to which an individual “cares for all humanity, not just for their
ingroups”. The general structure of the IWAH measure is similar to our social identity indexes,
because respondents are asked to evaluate their identification with, and attitudes toward, (a)
people in their community, (b) co-nationals, and (c) “all humans everywhere” [10]. Although
the phrasing used to identify these three categories differs slightly from the one we used, the
two measures appear comparable. In a sample comprising US participants only, the IWAH
measure records the same pattern we found in our study, with identification with global com-
munity being lower than identification with local and national communities, the latter two
being approximately equal to each other. Our analysis reported above enables us to say that
this same pattern holds, even more pronouncedly, in other countries, being the US at the
lower end of the differences between GSI and the other social identity measures.
Analysis of the factors associated with GSI
An implication of the cosmopolitan model of social identity is that increased participation and
exposure to global networks should be associated with increased identification with the global
Fig 3. Average levels of local, national, and global social identity, per country. Descriptive statistics for the whole sample are reported in Table E in the S1 Appendix.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0206819.g003
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community. We test for this idea through a tobit model. The first specification (see Table 1,
column 1) demonstrates a strongly significant correlation between GSI and both CGI and IGI.
That is, people living in more globalized countries and those who are more involved in global
networks are also more likely to declare higher identification with the global community. In
other words, the more an individual participates in the global network, the higher their GSI.
Among the demographic factors, females and people older than 50 years (variable ‘Age
High’), are also more likely to score high in GSI. Having attained higher levels of education
than the primary level (variable ‘Education High’) also shows a positive effect on GSI, but this
is not robust to the inclusion of further controls in the ensuing regressions. Interestingly
enough, the variable ‘Income High’, identifying people reporting a level of income belonging
to the seventh, or upper, decile of a country’s income distribution has a significantly negative
effect on GSI (p = 0.005), in relation to people with low income (lower or equal to the third
decile). We further investigate this result below. Living in large urban areas (variable ‘City’) or
in areas with relatively high numbers of foreign immigrants (variable ‘Foreign Immigrants’)
seems to be uncorrelated with GSI.
The second model (see Table 1, column 2) includes both NSI and LSI as controls. An indi-
vidual may experience attachment to any group, rather than experience specific attachment to
the global community. In this second specification, the results are to be understood as analyz-
ing the impact of a variable on GSI relative to LSI and NSI. Both LSI and, even more so, NSI
show positive correlations with GSI. A one standard deviation unit in NSI increases GSI by
0.42 standard deviation units (p<0.001), while the impact for LSI is smaller, namely, 0.11
(p = 0.015). Both CGI and IGI continue to exert a positive and strongly significant effect on
GSI. The same holds for gender and high income (p<0.001 for all these four variables).
Females’ GSI scores are, ceteris paribus, nearly 6% higher than men’s scores. This result goes
hand-in-hand with females scoring higher in our Global Awareness Index (p = 0.011). Con-
versely, McFarland et al. [10] find no significant effect of gender and greater knowledge of
global issues by males rather than females. The effect of belonging to the older age group is
also still significant (p = 0.047). The positive correlation between age and GSI may be surpris-
ing, in the light of the emphasis posed by some scholars on younger generations being particu-
larly exposed to the influence of global culture [28]. Nevertheless, we note that the IWAH scale
developed by McFarland et al. [10] also found lower identification with any of the three catego-
rization levels (local, national, and global) in a university student sample than in an adult sam-
ple, thus indirectly confirming our result.
These first analyses are “between-country” because of the omission of country dummies.
This may introduce some confounding effects if some variable is correlated with country-level
globalization. For this reason, regression 3 introduces country dummies so the analysis is now
to be understood as being “within-country”. The introduction of country fixed effects obliter-
ates from the analysis all variables that are invariant within-country, such as CGI. In results
from this third regression analysis, IGI (p<0.001), NSI (p<0.001), and LSI (p = 0.019) main-
tain strong positive effects, as well as gender (p = 0.01), higher age (p = 0.040), and higher
income (p = 0.002) (see Table 1, column 3).
The last specification (see Table 1, column 4) includes several additional variables measur-
ing a participant’s ‘Global Awareness Index’ (see “Materials and Methods”), some attitudinal
measures concerning globalization, and variables identifying the participant’s occupational sit-
uation. All these variables are derived from the questionnaire, as described in Table E in the S1
Appendix and in the S3 Appendix. The regression shows that people who are more aware of
global issues report significantly higher scores for GSI (variable ‘Global Awareness Index’)
(p<0.001). McFarland et al. [10], too, found a high correlation between their IWAH and both
global knowledge and global humanitarian concerns.
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Table 1. Regression analysis of factors associated with GSI.
DEPENDENT VARIABLE GSI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CGI 0.217��� 0.264���
(0.0468) (0.0417)
IGI 0.564��� 0.521��� 0.487��� 0.287���
(0.0916) (0.0830) (0.0865) (0.0866)
National Social Identity 0.492��� 0.497��� 0.508���
Index (0.0481) (0.0492) (0.0496)
Local Social Identity Index 0.110�� 0.106�� 0.0741�
(0.0450) (0.0450) (0.0445)
Foreign Immigrants -0.00357 -0.0159 -0.0152 -0.0238
(0.0271) (0.0243) (0.0242) (0.0240)
Female 0.0637��� 0.0645��� 0.0605��� 0.0538���
(0.0199) (0.0178) (0.0182) (0.0179)
Education Medium 0.0568�� 0.0393 0.0254 0.0260
(0.0262) (0.0239) (0.0255) (0.0247)
Education High 0.0370 0.0388� 0.0354 0.0256
(0.0239) (0.0213) (0.0225) (0.0222)
Age Medium 0.0244 -0.0178 -0.00986 -0.00836
(0.0230) (0.0206) (0.0205) (0.0204)
Age High 0.115��� 0.0475�� 0.0487�� 0.0363
(0.0263) (0.0239) (0.0237) (0.0245)
Income Medium -0.0273 -0.0249 -0.0241 -0.0149
(0.0251) (0.0224) (0.0224) (0.0222)
Income High -0.0833��� -0.0933��� -0.0895��� -0.0671��
(0.0299) (0.0265) (0.0283) (0.0291)
City -0.0158 -0.0281 -0.0339� -0.0149
(0.0223) (0.0199) (0.0203) (0.0200)
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Other attitudinal measures are also significantly related with the GSI. The less a participant
believes that their citizens’ way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence (variable
‘Way of Life’), and that entry of foreigners should be restricted (variable ‘Entry’), the higher
their GSI (p<0.01 for both variables). These results are again in line with McFarland et al. [10],
who found a strong predictive negative power of their measure of ethnocentrism and their
IWAH. Additionally, we find that the more the participant believes that trade, global business,
faster communication and greater movements of people are a good thing (variable ‘Opinion
Glob.’), the higher their GSI score (p = 0.015). It is also noteworthy that participants scoring
high in GSI are significantly more likely to be active in voluntary associations (variable ‘Associ-
ation Membership’) (p = 0.026).
Among the demographic controls, gender (p = 0.003) and high income (p = 0.021) continue
to exert significant effects, while belonging to the older age group becomes non-significant
(p = 0.138). The apparent robustness of the effect of ‘Income High’ warrants further investiga-
tion. We note that ‘Income High’ is highly correlated with IGI (ρ = 0.39) and we suspect that
this may cause multi-collinearity problems. In fact, when IGI is omitted from the model,
‘Income High’ is no longer significant (p = 0.207). We also note that the raw linear correlation
between ‘Income High’ and GSI is relatively low (ρ = 0.03), while the correlation between IGI
and GSI is considerably larger (ρ = 0.19). We compute the Variance Inflation Factor (a mea-
sure of how much a variable may create multi-collinearity problems in a regression) for
‘Income High’. Such a factor is very close to the threshold suggested by Allison [49] to signal
serious multi-collinearity problems (2.45 vis-à-vis a suggested threshold of 2.5), and, except
country dummies, is the variable contributing the most to inflating variance. We conclude that
the negative sign of ‘Income High’ appears to be driven by its correlation with IGI rather than
signaling a real independent effect.
The occupational variables are not significant, although ‘Self-employed’ is at the border of
significance (p = 0.109). Finally, the IGI maintains a strongly positive effect on GSI (p = 0.001),
even after all these demographic and attitudinal variables are controlled for. This further
proves the robustness of the correlation between participation in the global network and GSI.
Table 1. (Continued)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE GSI







Constant 0.156��� -0.226��� -0.173��� -0.0867
(0.0505) (0.0519) (0.0506) (0.0670)
Observations 998 994 994 948
Pseudo R2 0.133 0.366 0.385 0.482




The description of variables is in Table E in the S1 Appendix.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0206819.t001
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We conclude:
Result 1: Consistent with the cosmopolitan ideal-type, increased participation in global net-
works–both at the individual and country levels—is associated with increased identification
with the global community.
Result 2: The analysis of several attitudinal factors confirms the validity of the GSI construct.
Generally speaking, individuals reporting high GSI scores express a positive view regarding
global flows of people and objects, and are more aware of global issues than individuals
who have lower scores. Women and, although less robustly, older people and more highly-
educated people report higher GSI scores. Income is negatively related with GSI, although
this result is likely to be driven by the strong correlation between income and IGI.
Analysis of the mediating effects of GSI between participation in global
networks and cooperation levels
In this section we investigate the relationships between IGI, GSI, and World-level cooperation,
examining whether GSI may be thought of as having a mediating effect on IGI as per the cos-
mopolitan hypothesis.
Fig 4 offers a graphical account of the relationship between CGI, GSI and World-level coop-
eration at the country level. It plots the mean level of both GSI and World-level cooperation,
as a function of the country’s CGI. A linear prediction of each variable shows a positive rela-
tionship. This means that the more a country is globalized, the more participants from that
country score high on the GSI and the more, on average, they contribute to the world account.
We perform a Sobel-Goodmann test [50] on the hypothesis that GSI exerts a mediating
effect between IGI and World-level cooperation. The main idea behind this test is that for a
variable z exerting a mediating effect between two variables x and y, the following three condi-
tions must hold: (1) x significantly influences y in the absence of z; (2) x significantly influences
z; (3) Once z is introduced as a covariate alongside x, the effect of x shrinks considerably, while
z exerts a significant effect on y. In the first specification, we show that condition (1) holds (see
Table 2, column 1). That is, IGI exerts a positive effect on World-level cooperation in our
experiment (p = 0.043). In the second specification (see Table 2, column 2), we show that con-
dition (2) holds as well, as IGI exerts a strong positive effect on GSI (p<0.001). Finally, the
third specification confirms that condition (3) also holds (see Table 2, column 3). Once the
GSI is introduced in the first model as a covariate, it exerts a strong effect on the dependent
variable (p<0.001), while IGI loses its significance (p = 0.33). The three models studied control
for a broad range of variables, namely, the global awareness index, NSI, LSI, demographic vari-
ables, a set of variables denoting an individual’s economic condition, and country dummies.
We also included as covariate a measure of baseline cooperation at the local level drawn from
the first experimental decision. That is the number of tokens contributed to the local account
in a linear PGG. In this fashion, our dependent variable may be seen as measuring the propen-
sity to cooperate at the global level that goes beyond the baseline propensity to cooperate at the
local level. We preferred to deploy this measure of cooperation from the first decision as a con-
trol, rather than the measure of Local-level cooperation from the third decision, because the
former measure is by construction independent from World-level cooperation. We further
analyze Local-level cooperation in the third decision in the subsequent sections. All results are
robust to omitting this measure of baseline local cooperation from the econometric models.
The Sobel-Goodmann test considers the difference in the coefficients for IGI in regressions
(1) and (3) and checks whether the drop in the coefficient is large enough to be considered sta-
tistically significant. Other diagnostic variables check the validity of the overall model. The test
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strongly confirms that the coefficient difference is significant (p = 0.002; proportion of total
effect that is mediated = 32%; bootstrapped std. err. with 1000 repetitions). This evidence sup-
ports the cosmopolitan hypothesis. Fig 1 plots the key relationships of the three econometric
models that have been analyzed. In the panel (a) the effect of IGI on World-level cooperation in
isolation from GSI is tested. Panel (b) illustrates both the direct and the indirect effect of IGI
onto cooperation, once a GSI mediation effect is explicitly introduced in the analysis. It is worth
noting that, in this case, while the indirect effect–i.e. the effect going from IGI to cooperation
through GSI—is strongly significant, the residual effect–i.e. that going from IGI to World-level
cooperation directly—is not statistically significant and thus, is fully mediated by the introduc-
tion of GSI in the model.
The fourth specification sheds more light on the nature of the relationship between GSI and
propensity to cooperate globally (see Table 2, column 4). It introduces an interaction effect
between the GSI and the three countries in our sample that have the highest level of globaliza-
tion, as measured by the CGI–namely, the Russian Federation, Italy, and the US. This allows
us to study whether GSI exerts differential effects in more highly-globalized countries vis-à-vis
lesser-globalized countries. The answer is positive. GSI exerts a significantly stronger effect in
countries at lower stages of globalization. This means that higher identification with the world
as a whole has larger effects on World-level cooperation in countries that have a lower baseline
level of globalization. For example, increasing one’s identification with the world community
in Iran is associated with a propensity to cooperate globally that is significantly higher than
increasing one’s identification with the world community in the US. We conclude:
Fig 4. Correlation between country-level globalization index, global social identity scale, and world-level cooperation.
The chart reports country-level mean values for the GSI index (circles), and the contribution to world account (WA)
(squares), as well as the linear predictions of GCI onto GSI and contributions to WA (dashed and solid lines, respectively).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0206819.g004
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Table 2. Regression analysis of mediating effect of GSI between IGI and World-level cooperation.












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IGI 1.180�� 0.417��� 0.860 0.902 -1.272�� -0.614
(0.547) (0.0864) (0.565) (0.554) (0.532) (0.535)
GSI 0.993��� 1.583���
(0.268) (0.321)






Global Awareness Index 0.648�� 0.274��� 0.402 0.468 -0.233 -0.528�
(0.294) (0.0458) (0.303) (0.297) (0.283) (0.278)
NSI 0.412 0.465��� -0.0243 -0.106 -0.193 -0.0338
(0.303) (0.0488) (0.337) (0.337) (0.270) (0.327)
LSI -0.207 0.0993�� -0.277 -0.304 -0.397 1.067���
(0.272) (0.0446) (0.276) (0.275) (0.241) (0.278)
Tokens contributed to Local
account (First decision)
0.372��� 0.0103��� 0.362��� 0.365��� -0.550��� 0.0516�
(0.0319) (0.00340) (0.0319) (0.0320) (0.0379) (0.0281)
City -0.350��� -0.0178 -0.353��� -0.371��� 0.306�� -0.0355
(0.131) (0.0200) (0.134) (0.127) (0.131) (0.143)
Female 0.00554 0.0583��� -0.0489 -0.0569 -0.137 0.186
(0.115) (0.0179) (0.117) (0.114) (0.109) (0.121)
Education Medium 0.184 0.0222 0.172 0.0938 -0.104 0.157
(0.151) (0.0250) (0.154) (0.149) (0.144) (0.150)
Education High 0.221 0.0255 0.199 0.216 -0.0381 0.0166
(0.152) (0.0225) (0.152) (0.134) (0.142) (0.155)
Age Medium -0.247� -0.0230 -0.225 -0.233� 0.105 0.0616
(0.144) (0.0205) (0.146) (0.142) (0.135) (0.142)
Age High -0.223 0.0409� -0.244 -0.198 -0.0739 0.276�
(0.154) (0.0243) (0.156) (0.155) (0.144) (0.166)
Income Medium 0.109 -0.00566 0.100 0.0506 -0.0756 -0.167
(0.142) (0.0227) (0.145) (0.142) (0.144) (0.142)
Income High 0.0529 -0.0619�� 0.100 -0.0190 -0.146 -0.186
(0.194) (0.0293) (0.196) (0.183) (0.186) (0.187)
Self Employed 0.130 0.0563� 0.113 0.0688 -0.0851 -0.104
(0.213) (0.0324) (0.213) (0.216) (0.185) (0.208)
Unemployed 0.527�� 0.0380 0.470� 0.506� -0.301 -0.268
(0.248) (0.0480) (0.253) (0.259) (0.286) (0.227)
Divorced 0.254 -0.0238 0.258 0.231 -0.147 -0.248
(0.203) (0.0276) (0.203) (0.198) (0.198) (0.205)
Russia 0.403� 0.121��� 0.258 -0.355 -0.122
(0.224) (0.0309) (0.231) (0.217) (0.218)
South Africa 0.129 0.0884�� 0.0416 -0.172 0.496��
(0.248) (0.0403) (0.253) (0.237) (0.222)
USA 0.673��� 0.138��� 0.539�� -0.721��� -0.411
(0.245) (0.0329) (0.251) (0.243) (0.254)
(Continued)
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Result 3: Our econometric and test analysis strongly supports the hypothesis that the GSI has
a mediating effect between IGI and propensity to cooperate at the global level. This is con-
sistent with the conjecture that participation in globalization increases propensity to coop-
erate at the global level as it simultaneously increases social identification with the world as
a whole.
Result 4: GSI exerts larger effects in countries at lower stages of globalization than countries at
higher stages of globalization.
Robustness analysis: Test of mediation effects and total effects for
alternative variables
Participation in global networks is itself a choice and so potentially endogenous to deeper pref-
erences that may explain the association between IGI and World-level cooperation. A particu-
larly important variable, in this respect, is one’s preference for participating and belonging to
groups. This is related with what has been labelled ‘groupy behavior’ [51]. Similarly, differ-
ences in basic predisposition to generosity might explain the observed behavior. In other
words, participating in global networks may be the consequence of deeper and more “hard-
wired” personality traits that explains both the increased propensity to cooperate and the ten-
dency to associate with global others.
Such personality traits—namely, the propensity to connect at the global level, the propen-
sity to participate in groups, generosity, and finally the propensity to cooperate—are likely to
be correlated with one another and it becomes difficult to single out which factor acts at a
deeper level than others. Nevertheless, it is interesting to compare the relative strength of asso-
ciation of these constructs with World-level cooperation. In this section we will identify some
proxies for each of the two possible additional explanatory variables, trying to “pit” them
against IGI as factors explaining World-level cooperation.
Our post-experimental questionnaire included a set of questions asking whether the indi-
vidual was a member of voluntary associations. Following a widely used taxonomy, we listed
Table 2. (Continued)












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Argentina -0.215 -0.0166 -0.220 -0.271 0.633��
(0.254) (0.0381) (0.255) (0.232) (0.253)
Italy 0.303 0.156��� 0.138 -0.433� -0.0789
(0.229) (0.0329) (0.234) (0.223) (0.232)
Constant -0.386���
(0.0548)
Observations 983 978 976 976 983 983
Pseudo R2 0.0788 0.441 0.0815 0.0821 0.132 0.0207
Note: A tobit model has been used in the regression in column 2. The censoring values are the lowest and upper value for GSI, i.e. 0 and 1. An ordered logit model has




The description of variables is in the Table E in S1 Appendix.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0206819.t002
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13 different types of association and we asked subjects to state whether they were members of
at least one association for each type (see Question 25 of questionnaire in S3 Appendix). We
also asked subjects to state whether the type of association they joined were active at the local,
national or global level (seeQuestion 26 of questionnaire in S3 Appendix). In the following
analyses we use five variables as independent variables alternative to IGI. The first is a dummy
variable that indicates whether an individual belonged to at least one association (“Association
Membership”). The second is a dummy variable that indicates that an individual is a member
of at least one association that is active globally, according to the participant’s opinion (“Global
Association Membership”). The other two variables consider the number of types of associa-
tions to which an individual belonged to, divided by the number of possible types–i.e. 13. This
scale has been often used as an index of the size of an individual’s social network, or social cap-
ital [52]. In our analysis we consider both “Number of Association Types” and “Number of
Global Association Types”, that is, the number of types of associations a participant belonged
to, and the number of types of global associations a participant belonged to, respectively.
Table S5 reports a description and descriptive statistics for all these alternative variables.
To proxy for a subject’s generosity, we consider the answer to two questions asking whether
the subject had contributed to either international aid efforts for natural disasters or for pov-
erty relief (see Question 5a and 5b in S3 Appendix). We derive a variable “Donation Index”
that is a summative scale of the dichotomous variables generated by answers to these questions.
Table E in the S1 Appendix reports descriptive statistics for these variables.
Table 3 reports the results of our analysis. We perform three tests. First, we substitute one
of these alternative variables for IGI in the mediation model. That is, an alternative variable
enters as independent variable of the model while GSI keeps on being the mediating variable
on “Cooperation” (see Table 3, columns 3, 5, 7, 9, 11). The second test adds IGI as a covariate
to the previous model (see Table 3, columns 4, 6, 8, 10, 12). We can thus test the validity of a
model having an alternative factor to IGI as independent variable while controlling for the
effect of IGI. The third test considers both the original model where IGI acts as independent
variable (Table 3, column 1), and the model where an alternative variable is added as covariate
of the model (Table 3, column 2). We only report the results for adding “Association Member-
ship” because this is the variable exerting the largest effects among the five additional variables
being considered. We report the coefficient, standard error and P-values for the Sobel-Good-
man mediation test, direct effect and total effect for each variable and for both models.
The main conclusion we can reach from this analysis is that the model with highest validity
is the one with IGI as independent variable. Firstly, the total effect does not reach statistical lev-
els of significance for any of the alternative variables being considered–except for “Association
Membership” achieving weak levels of significance (p = 0.086)—when IGI is not included in
the model. In contrast, the total effect for IGI is significant both without (p = 0.022) and con-
trolling for “Association Membership” (p = 0.035). Finally, even if the Sobel-Goodman media-
tion test is statistically significant for all the variables considered, the significance is highest for
the model with IGI as independent variable.
To have a sense of the relative effects of IGI and “Association Membership”, we consider the
coefficients of their total effects. All variables have been standardized so their effects are directly
comparable. An increase of one standard deviation of IGI increases propensity to contribute to the
global account by 0.23 tokens (P = 0.022), while the increase of one standard deviation of “Associa-
tion Membership” increases contributions to the global account by 0.15 tokens (P = 0.086). The
effect of “Association Membership” is then about one third smaller than IGI. What is more, the
two effects seem to be rather orthogonal to each other, as the total effect coefficients decrease only
marginally once the alternative variable is included in the model. The total effect coefficient drops
from 0.23 to 0.22 for IGI, and from 0.15 to 0.13 for “Association Membership”.
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Analyses of the impact of IGI on contribution to other accounts
In the above analysis our dependent variable was the contribution to the world account in the
third decision of our experiment. Given the design of the decision, an increased contribution to
global causes must be paid for by reductions in either the contribution to the local account or to
the personal account. It is important to examine which one between these two accounts is
affected by IGI. Individual globalization may be associated with a willingness to adjust contribu-
tions between public goods–so that more globalized individuals substitute contributions to the
global account for contributions to the local account. Alternatively, individual globalization may
go with increased generosity–so that more globalized individuals reduce their contributions to
the personal account while keeping constant their contributions to the local public good.
Our econometric analysis supports the latter hypothesis. We replicate the same model used
in Table 2, column 1, to estimate the effects of IGI on contributions to the world account, and
we replace the dependent variable with contribution to the personal account (Table 2, column
5) and to the local account in Decision 3 (Table 2, column 6). We find that in both cases IGI
exerts a negative effect, but this is statistically significant only for the personal account
(p = 0.017), but not for the local account in Decision 3 (p = 0.25). Switching from a score of 0
in IGI to a score of 1 in IGI leads to a decrease of 0.31 (from 0.61 to 0.30) in the probability
that an individual will give more than 3 tokens (the median of the distribution) to the Personal
account. The same switch implies a drop in the probability of giving more than 3 tokens to the
Local account of only 0.15 (from 0.62 to 0.47). Hence, to a large extent, increased IGI is associ-
ated with both increased contributions to the world account and reduced contribution to the


















































0.074��� 0.074��� 0.074��� 0.035�� 0.074��� 0.035�� 0.039�� 0.028�� 0.074��� 0.041�� 0.074��� -0.049��
Std. Err. 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
P-value 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.015 0.07 0.015 0.015 0.037 0.003 0.013 0.005 0.010
Direct effect 0.16 0.15 0.11 0.094 -0.071 0.094 -0.032 -0.051 0.068 0.048 -0.067 -0.046
Std. Err. 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.10
P-value 0.13 0.14 0.22 0.28 0.43 0.28 0.70 0.57 0.42 0.58 0.51 0.65
Total effect 0.23�� 0.22�� 0.15� 0.13 -0.011 -0.040 0.008 -0.023 0.12 0.088 -0.13 -0.095
Std. Err. 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11
P-value 0.022 0.035 0.086 0.14 0.91 0.68 0.93 0.79 0.20 0.36 0.22 0.37
Observations 976 976 976 976 976 976 976 976 976 976 973 973
Note: We report coefficients, standard errors and P-values for the Sobel-Goodman test of mediation, for the “direct effect”–namely, the effect of the independent
variable after GSI is included in the model–and for the “total effect”—i.e. the effect when GSI is not included in the model. Standard errors for the Sobel-Goodman test




The description of variables is in Table E of the S1 Appendix.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0206819.t003
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personal account, leaving unaffected contributions to the local public good. This result helps
characterize the psychological effects of participation in global networks. It suggests that
greater involvement in global networks does not reduce propensity to cooperate with the local
community. Rather, increased participation in global networks is associated with a genuine
increase in overall generosity. This result further corroborates other findings on the positive
association between identification with the whole humanity and generosity [10, 11].
Discussion
The provision of public goods that are global in character calls for substantial cooperation at
the global level by the relevant national parties [53]. Examples of such global public goods are
the prevention of catastrophic climate change, a stable international financial architecture,
averting the diffusion of contagious diseases, human security [54, 55]. Traditional policy analy-
sis assigns national governments the duty to attain cooperation agreements to supply such
public goods [56]. Nevertheless, in spite of global cooperation having developed in the last
decades in many different arenas, ranging from climate change agreements to global vaccina-
tion programs, provision of global public goods today still falls very short, in the eyes of many,
of the levels that are needed [57].
Partly as a result of the failure of national and intergovernmental action, direct action by
individuals participating in formal or informal associations, or in self-coordinated forms of
collective action, is seen as increasingly relevant for global cooperation. The actors behind
these actions have been named “global civil society” [58–60]. The set of actors comprising
global civil society is broad and includes environmental movements, labor unions, human
rights promoters [61] and individuals active in so-called political consumerism [62,63].
In spite of the increased recognition of the role that individual citizens, alone or coalesced
in movements or associations, play in global cooperation, our understanding of the mecha-
nisms that shape the creation of such a global conscience, and the extent to which this gener-
ates public action, are little explored, let alone understood. The purpose of the present study
has been to fill this gap using experimental methods.
More specifically, we have mapped the demographic characteristics, attitudinal values, and
personality traits that are significantly correlated with our proposed index of global social iden-
tity and analyzed the linkages between participation in global networks, global social identity
and propensity to cooperate at the global level. We found that individuals reporting high GSI
scores expressed a positive view regarding global flows of people and objects and were more
aware of global issues than individuals who have lower scores. Women and, although less
robustly, older people and more highly-educated people tended to obtain higher GSI scores
than others. We also found that GSI exerted larger effects in countries at lower stages of global-
ization than countries at higher stages of globalization. At the policy level, these results suggest
that groups of countries who want to foster global cooperation may implement policies aiming
to foster individual identification with the global community. According to Result 4, the bene-
fits from these policies may be particularly high in countries with low levels of globalization.
Admittedly, the engagement of individual citizens in global agreements for the provision of
global public goods is currently rare [54]. Our findings provide evidence that higher engage-
ment by the citizenry should on the contrary be sought after. In fact, identification with global
communities is significantly lower than attachment to local and national communities in any
country we surveyed.
As for the analysis of the cosmopolitan hypothesis, it had been demonstrated that (1)
Increased participation in global networks is associated with increased propensity to cooperate
at the global level. (2) Heightened identification with the global community is also associated
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with increased global-level cooperation [6,7]. In this contribution we have demonstrated a key
relationship that corroborates the validity of the cosmopolitan hypothesis: (3) Global social
identity exerts a mediating effect between participation in global networks and propensity to
cooperate. This means that participation in global networks exerts an indirect effect on
increased propensity to cooperate such that participation in global networks increases global
social identity, which in turn increases propensity to cooperate globally. We hasten to say that
the result of this test does not enable us to say that we have proved the existence of a causal
relationship between the three variables at play. It will have the more modest, but arguably
important, result of having ascertained that the evidence coming from our study is consistent
with the cosmopolitan hypothesis, and therefore such a hypothesis has “survived” a relevant
trial that may have led to its falsification.
The relevance of such a mediating mechanism also implies that increased participation in
global networks is associated with the development of a sense of global social identity. This fur-
ther undermines the ‘‘reactant” individual hypothesis, which posits increased entrenchment in
local and national social identity as a result of globalization [6–8]. At least for those individuals
who actively participate in globalization, higher levels of participation are associated with
higher levels of cosmopolitan identity and global cooperation. We also demonstrated that such
an increased propensity to cooperate at the global level does not come at the cost of reduced
propensity to cooperate at the local level of interaction, but rather is associated with an overall
increase in generosity. Finally, our robustness tests confirm the greater validity of IGI as an
independent variable in comparison with other potentially relevant variables, such as the pro-
pensity to participate in associations and overall generosity.
Globalization is an all-encompassing process which is likely to affect fundamental aspects
of human psychology. The results presented in this research confirm the existence of a strong
and theoretically plausible association between participation in global networks, social iden-
tity, and propensity to cooperate with global others, paving the way for future research to gain
better understanding of the underlying mechanisms.
Supporting information
S1 Appendix. Supporting tables.
(PDF)
S2 Appendix. Methodological notes on the construction of the CGI and IGI Indexes and
on sampling strategy.
(PDF)
S3 Appendix. Research questionnaire.
(PDF)
S4 Appendix. Experiment script.
(PDF)
S1 Data. Dataset and codes to replicate econometric analysis.
(ZIP)
Acknowledgments
We thank the co-investigators of the project Enrique Fatas, Margaret Foddy and Rick Wilson.
We also thank Donna Bahry, Patricio Dalton, Iain Edwards, and Saul Keifman and many
other research assistants, for their valuable contribution to the fieldwork. We especially thank
Warren Thorngate at Carlton University for making data collection in Iran possible. We also
Globalization, social identity and individual cooperation
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0206819 December 14, 2018 22 / 25
acknowledge organizational support from the Center for the Study of Globalization and
Regionalization (CSGR) at the University of Warwick, the Center for International Business
Education and Research (CIBER) at the University of South Carolina, the Laboratory for
Research in Experimental Economics (LINNEX) at the University of Valencia, the Spanish
Ministry of Science and Education, the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council, the Center for Research and Education in Economic Development (CIDED) in
Argentina, and EconomEtica in Italy. We thank a reviewer for valuable comments and Norma
Madrid for assisting in editing this paper.
The dataset on which this paper is based is available online as S1 Data. Data and experiment
protocol have also been deposited at these repositories: https://osf.io/ytp9s/; dx.doi.org/10.
17504/protocols.io.v5we87e.
Author Contributions
Conceptualization: Gianluca Grimalda, Nancy Buchan, Marilynn Brewer.
Data curation: Gianluca Grimalda, Nancy Buchan, Marilynn Brewer.
Formal analysis: Gianluca Grimalda, Nancy Buchan, Marilynn Brewer.
Funding acquisition: Gianluca Grimalda, Nancy Buchan, Marilynn Brewer.
Investigation: Gianluca Grimalda, Nancy Buchan, Marilynn Brewer.
Methodology: Gianluca Grimalda, Nancy Buchan, Marilynn Brewer.
Project administration: Gianluca Grimalda, Nancy Buchan, Marilynn Brewer.
Resources: Gianluca Grimalda, Nancy Buchan, Marilynn Brewer.
Software: Gianluca Grimalda, Nancy Buchan, Marilynn Brewer.
Supervision: Gianluca Grimalda, Nancy Buchan, Marilynn Brewer.
Validation: Gianluca Grimalda, Nancy Buchan, Marilynn Brewer.
Visualization: Gianluca Grimalda, Nancy Buchan, Marilynn Brewer.
Writing – original draft: Gianluca Grimalda, Nancy Buchan, Marilynn Brewer.
Writing – review & editing: Gianluca Grimalda, Nancy Buchan, Marilynn Brewer.
References
1. Robertson R. Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture. London: Sage; 1992.
2. Scholte J. Globalisation: A Critical Introduction. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave; 2005.
3. Harvey D. The Condition of Postmodernity. Oxford: Blackwell; 1989.
4. Lockwood B and Redoano M. The CSGR Globalisation Index: an Introductory Guide. CSGR Working
Paper 155/04; 2005. Index available at: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/index/
5. Dreher A. Does Globalization Affect Growth? Evidence from a new Index of Globalization. Applied Eco-
nomics. 2006; 38(10):1091–110.
6. Buchan N, Grimalda G, Wilson R, Brewer M, Fatas E, Foddy M. Globalization and Human Cooperation.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA. 2009; 106(11):4138–42. https://doi.org/
10.1073/pnas.0809522106 PMID: 19255433
7. Buchan N, Brewer M, Grimalda G, Wilson R, Fatas E, Foddy M. Global Identity and Global Cooperation.
Psychological Science. 2011; 22(6): 821–28. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797611409590 PMID: 21586763
8. Buchan N, Fatas E, Grimalda G. Connectivity and Cooperation. In: Bolton G, Croson R, editors. The
Oxford Handbook of Economic Conflict Resolution. New York: Oxford University Press Inc.; 2012. p.
155–79. DOI: 978-0-19-973085-8.
Globalization, social identity and individual cooperation
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0206819 December 14, 2018 23 / 25
9. Giddens A. Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age. Cambridge: Polity
Press; 1991.
10. McFarland S, Webb M, Brown D. All humanity is my ingroup: A measure and studies of identification
with all humanity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 2012; 103(5):830. https://doi.org/10.
1037/a0028724 PMID: 22708625
11. Reese G, Berthold A, Steffens MC. We are the world—and they are not: Prototypicality for the world
community, legitimacy, and responses to global inequality. Political Psychology. 2012; 33(5):683–700.
12. Beck U. The Cosmopolitan Vision. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press; 2006.
13. Held D, McGrew A, Goldblatt D, and Perraton J. Chapter 3: Rethinking Globalisation. In: Held D, editor.
Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press and Stanford
University Press; 1999.
14. Scholte JA. Civil society and democracy in global governance. Global Governance. 2002;281–304.
15. Tajfel H. Human groups and social categories: Studies in social psychology. Cambridge: CUP Archive;
1981.
16. Tajfel H, Turner JC. The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. Psychology of intergroup relations.
1986;7–24
17. Turner JC, Hogg M, Oakes P, Reicher S, Wetherell M. Rediscovering the social group: A self-categori-
zation theory. Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell; 1987.
18. Mullen B, Brown R, Smith C. Ingroup bias as a function of salience, relevance, and status: An integra-
tion. European Journal of Social Psychology. 1992; 22(2):103–22.
19. Yamagishi T, Kiyonari T. The group as the container of generalized reciprocity. Social Psychology
Quarterly. 2000; 63: 116–32.
20. Fershtman C, Gneezy U. Discrimination in a segmented society: An experimental approach. Quarterly
Journal of Economics. 2001; 116:351–77.
21. Ruffle B, Sosis R. Cooperation and the in-group-out-group bias: A field test on Israeli kibbutz members
and city residents. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2006; 60:147–63.
22. Goette L, Huffman D, Meier S. The Impact of Group Membership on Cooperation and Norm Enforce-
ment: Evidence Using Random Assignment to Real Social Groups. American Economic Review. 2006;
96(2):212–16.
23. Charness G, Rigotti L, Rustichini A. Individual Behavior and Group Membership. American Economic
Review. 2007; 97(4):1340–52.
24. Habyarimana J, Humphreys M, Posner DN, Weinstein JM. Why does ethnic diversity undermine public
goods provision?. American Political Science Review. 2007; 101(04):709–25.
25. Whitt S, Wilson RK. The Dictator Game, Fairness and Ethnicity in Postwar Bosnia. American Journal of
Political Science. 2007; 51:655–68.
26. Chen Y, Li SX. Group Identity and Social Preferences. American Economic Review. 2009; 99(1):431–57.
27. Pichler F. How real is cosmopolitanism in Europe?. Sociology. 2008; 42(6):1107–26.
28. Arnett JJ. The psychology of globalization. American psychologist. 2002; 57(10):774. https://doi.org/10.
1037/0003-066X.57.10.774 PMID: 12369500
29. Hannerz U. Cultural Complexity: Studies in the Social Organization of Meaning. New York: Columbia
University Press; 1992.
30. Cheah P, Robbins B. Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation. Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press; 1998.
31. Brown GW, Held D, editors. The cosmopolitanism reader. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press; 2010.
32. Keating M. Nations against the State: The New Politics of Nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia and Scot-
land. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave; 200.
33. Castells M. Power of Identity. Malden, MA: Blackwell; 2004.
34. Marty ME, Appleby RS, editors. Fundamentalisms and society: reclaiming the sciences, the family and
education. (Vol. 2) Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press; 1993.
35. Kramer RM, Brewer MB. Social group identity and the emergence of cooperation in resource conserva-
tion dilemmas. In: Wilke H, Messick D, Rutte C, editors. Experimental social dilemmas. Frankfurt, Ger-
many: Verlag Peter Lang; 1986. p. 129–37.
36. Brewer MB. The social self: On being the same and different at the same time. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin. 1991; 17:475–82.
37. De Cremer D, Van Vugt M. Social identification effects in social dilemmas: A transformation of motives.
European Journal of Social Psychology. 1999; 29:871–93.
Globalization, social identity and individual cooperation
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0206819 December 14, 2018 24 / 25
38. De Cremer D, van Dijk E. Reactions to group success and failure as a function of identification level: A
test of the goal transformation hypothesis in social dilemmas. Journal of Experimental Social Psychol-
ogy. 2002; 38:435–42.
39. Messner D, Guarı´n A, Haun D. The behavioural dimensions of international cooperation. In Messner D
and Weinlich S (eds.) Global Cooperation and the Human Factor in International Relations. Routledge,
2015; 65–83.
40. Tomasello M. The ultra-social animal. European journal of social psychology. 2014; 44(3):187–94.
https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2015 PMID: 25641998
41. Dorrough AR, Glo¨ckner A. Multinational investigation of cross-societal cooperation. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences. 2016; 113(39):10836–41.
42. Blackwell C, McKee M. Only for my own neighborhood? Preferences and voluntary provision of local
and global public goods. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2003; 52:115–31.
43. Wit AP, Kerr NL. “Me versus just us versus all” Categorization and cooperation in nested social dilem-
mas. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 2002; 83:616–37. PMID: 12219858
44. Ledyard JO. Public Goods. In: Kagel J, Roth A, editors. Handbook of Experimental Economics. Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press; 1995. p.112–94.
45. Yuki M, Maddux W, Brewer MB, Takemura K. Cross-Cultural Differences in Relationship and Group-
Based Trust. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. 2004; 31(1):48–62.
46. World Value Survey [Internet]. Madrid, Spain: World Values Survey Association. 2010–2014. Wave 6.
OFFICIAL AGGREGATE v.20141107. Aggregate File Producer: Asep/JDS. Available from www.
worldvaluessurvey.org.
47. PEW Global Attitudes Project [Internet]. 2012. Report available at: http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2002/
12/2002-Report-Final-Updated.pdf
48. Statistical Census of Iran [Internet]. 2011. Accessed online at https://www.amar.org.ir/english/
Population-and-Housing-Censuses.
49. Allison P. When can you safely ignore multicollinearity. Statistical Horizons. 2012; 5(1).
50. Sobel ME. Asymptotic confidence intervals for indirect effects in structural equation models. Sociologi-
cal Methodology. 1982; 13:290–312.
51. Kranton R, Pease M, Sanders S, and Huettel S. “Groupy and Not Groupy Behavior: Deconstructing
Bias in Social Preferences,”, March 2018.
52. Knack S, Keefer P. Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation.
Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1997; 112:1251–1288.
53. Kaul I, Conceicao P, Le Gouleven K, Mendoza RU, editors. Providing Global Public Goods: Managing
Globalization. New York: Oxford University Press. 2003. p. 2–20.
54. Barrett S. Why cooperate? The incentive to supply global public goods. Oxford: Oxford University
Press; 2007.
55. Ocampo JA. Rethinking global economic and social governance. Journal of Globalization and Develop-
ment. 2010; 1(1).
56. Ostrom E. Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press; 1990.
57. Nordhaus WD. The climate casino: Risk, uncertainty, and economics for a warming world. New haven,
CT: Yale University Press; 2013.
58. Anheier H, Glasius M, Kaldor M, editors. Global Civil Society 2001. Oxford: Oxford University Press;
2001.
59. Scholte JA. What Is Globalization? The Definitional Issue–Again. Center for the Study of Globalisation
and Regionalisation (CSGR) Working Paper No. 109/02; 2002.
60. Ruggie JG. Reconstituting the Global Public Domain: Issues, Actors, and Practices. European Journal
of International Relations. 2004; 10: 499–531.
61. Castells M. The new public sphere: Global civil society, communication networks, and global gover-
nance. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 2008; 616(1):78–93.
62. Micheletti M, Føllesdal A, Stolle D, editors. Politics, Products and Markets. Exploring Political Consum-
erism Past and Present. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Press; 2003.
63. Stolle D, Hooghe M, Micheletti M. Politics in the supermarket: Political consumerism as a form of politi-
cal participation. International Political Science Review. 2005; 26(3):245–69.
Globalization, social identity and individual cooperation
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0206819 December 14, 2018 25 / 25
